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A B S T R A C T   
Cassirer’s philosophical agenda revolved around what appears to be a paradoxical goal, that is, to reconcile the 
Kantian explanation of the possibility of knowledge with the conceptual changes of nineteenth and early 
twentieth-century science. This paper offers a new discussion of one way in which this paradox manifests itself in 
Cassirer’s philosophy of mathematics. Cassirer articulated a unitary perspective on mathematics as an investi-
gation of structures independently of the nature of individual objects making up those structures. However, this 
posed the problem of how to account for the applicability of abstract mathematical concepts to empirical reality. 
My suggestion is that Cassirer was able to address this problem by giving a transcendental account of mathe-
matical reasoning, according to which the very formation of mathematical concepts provides an explanation of 
the extensibility of mathematical knowledge. In order to spell out what this argument entails, the first part of the 
paper considers how Cassirer positioned himself within the Marburg neo-Kantian debate over intellectual and 
sensible conditions of knowledge in 1902–1910. The second part compares what Cassirer says about mathematics 
in 1910 with some relevant examples of how structural procedures developed in nineteenth-century 
mathematics.   
1. Introduction 
Ernst Cassirer’s epistemological work is being discussed again in a 
variety of contexts, from Michael Friedman’s dynamics of reason to 
different variants of ontic and structural realism.1 However, much of this 
discussion focuses on Cassirer’s account of scientific objectivity while 
calling into question the feasibility of his philosophical project. This is 
mainly due to the fact that Cassirer’s neo-Kantian agenda revolves 
around what appears to be a paradoxical goal, that is, to reconcile the 
Kantian explanation of the possibility of knowledge with the conceptual 
changes of nineteenth and early twentieth-century science. 
This paper offers a new discussion of one way in which this paradox 
manifests itself in Cassirer’s philosophy of mathematics. Beginning in 
1910, Cassirer articulated a unitary perspective on mathematics as an 
investigation of structures independently of the nature of individual 
objects making up those structures. However, a tension remains between 
Cassirer’s demand for the unity of knowledge and his reliance on the 
structural methods of nineteenth-century mathematics. Cassirer tried to 
resolve this tension in his early works by pointing out that the loss of 
unity with regard to the subject-matter of modern mathematics – insofar 
as this ceases to define itself as the science of numbers and quantities – is 
compensated by the deeper unity of its method (Cassirer, 1907b, p. 31; 
1910, p. 36). However, after the development of modern axiomatics, 
Cassirer realized ever more clearly that mathematics (including the most 
abstract parts of it) raises new problems of its own. In general, beginning 
in the 1920s, he acknowledged different types of objectivity at stake in 
the different ways to understand the world, which he called “symbolic 
forms.” This seems to suggest that in order to account for the unity of 
mathematics in the latter sense, it would be inevitable to call into 
question the unity of knowledge in Cassirer’s original account. 
More recent discussions of Cassirer’s philosophy of mathematics 
reflect the same tension. Heis (2010) suggests that a charitable way to 
read Cassirer today would have to offer a unitary account of mathe-
matical objectivity. By contrast, Mormann (2008) maintains that the 
central thesis of Cassirer’s philosophy from 1910 to his later works is 
that mathematical and physical knowledge are of the same kind 
(sameness thesis). Mormann offers a series of examples of how the 
extension of both kinds of knowledge requires the introduction of ideal 
elements. It follows, however, that a consistent development of the 
sameness thesis in the light of twentieth-century mathematics would 
have to acknowledge incompatible idealizations. In other words, quite 
contrary to Heis, Mormann’s suggestion is to allow for a plurality of 
conceptual frameworks in the philosophy of mathematics in order to 
retain the main insight of the sameness thesis. 
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1 For a discussion of the receptions of Cassirer in contemporary philosophy of science, along with further references, see Heis (2014b). 
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The aim of this paper is to clarify how both aspects of Cassirer’s 
philosophy stand together by spelling out the sameness thesis in terms of 
a transcendental claim that can be summarized as follows: Structural 
reasoning is an indispensable precondition for mathematical objectivity and 
for the applicability of mathematics in scientific theories. The corresponding 
claim in Kant’s transcendental philosophy is that: Spatiotemporal struc-
tures are necessary conditions for the apodictic certainty of mathematics and 
for the applicability of mathematics to all objects of experience.2 A number 
of authors have emphasized that Cassirer departs from Kant, insofar as 
Kant’s mediating structures for connecting mathematical to empirical 
concepts (i.e., the forms of intuition), in Cassirer’s claim, are replaced 
with a structuralist view of mathematics (see Friedman, 2001; Heis, 
2010; 2014a). This allows him to reaffirm the applicability of mathe-
matics with respect to the concrete interpretations of mathematical 
structures in scientific theories. However, this would imply a shift from 
Kant’s conditions for the possibility of experience to the ideas of unity 
and stability that regulate the organization of scientific laws. This seems 
to come at the price of abandoning Kant’s transcendental deduction, 
that is, the proof that the categories of the understanding correctly apply 
to all objects of experience via the mediating synthesis of space and time. 
I will argue that, by contrast, the very notions of structural and 
mathematical reasoning in Cassirer’s view are derived from the reading 
of the Kantian theory of experience articulated by Cassirer’s teachers, 
Cohen and Natorp, and further developed by Cassirer (1907a). I will 
then turn to how Cassirer connects the account of mathematical 
reasoning that emerges from this reading to the structural turn of 
nineteenth-century mathematics. 
My suggestion is that a more careful consideration of the key ex-
amples for Cassirer’s account can shed light on his long-term strategy to 
resolve the tension between his emphasis on the unity of mathematics 
and the sameness thesis. This tension is sharpened by the fact that the 
contemporary literature on Cassirer’s philosophy of mathematics fo-
cuses on the embedding of a particular domain into a larger structure. 
Paradigmatic examples of this are the introduction of irrational numbers 
as limits of converging series of rational numbers and the generalization 
of the Euclidean plane to the projective plane. While these examples 
underpin a unitary perspective on specific mathematical disciplines, 
they seem to suggest an oversimplified account of how mathematical 
concepts extend beyond the original ground for their development. I will 
argue that there is a no less essential aspect of concept formation in 
Cassirer’s sense, that is the transposition of structural methods from one 
domain to another. Three examples are particularly relevant here: (1) 
Dedekind’s definition of natural numbers, (2) Felix Klein’s use of 
transfer principles, (3) the construction of a numerical scale on the 
projective line. The epistemological implications of Cassirer’s approach 
follow from the more articulated picture of structural mathematics that 
emerges from such examples, or so I will argue. 
2. The philosophical roots of Cassirer’s account 
The philosophical roots of Cassirer’s account are found in Hermann 
Cohen’s reading of Kant and the further development of Cohen’s ideas in 
the critical idealism of the Marburg School. This is the view that sci-
entific theories are the only facts available for the investigation of 
knowledge and should not be confused with something given directly to 
the senses. This posed the problem of clarifying the relation of sensible 
and intellectual conditions of knowledge, that is, the pillar of Kant’s 
critique of reason. Cohen developed his views in this regard in several 
stages of his intellectual career, which caused a controversy with Paul 
Natorp and other members of the school. At the center of the debate was 
Cohen’s claim that the structure of Kant’s Critique ought to be substan-
tially rethought by identifying Kant’s Anticipations of Perception with 
the Leibnizian principle of the infinitesimal method. 
The following section considers how Cassirer positioned himself in 
the debate about Kant’s relation to Leibniz. It will become clear that 
Cassirer started from interpretative issues that were lively discussed in 
the Marburg School to address the tasks of the neo-Kantian 
epistemology. 
2.1. The debate about Kant’s relation to Leibniz in the Marburg School 
Cohen presented his interpretation of Kant’s critique of reason as an 
investigation into the conceptual structure of experience in 1871. 
However, it was only in the 1880s that Cohen elaborated on the impli-
cations of his interpretation for the relation between transcendental 
philosophy and the sciences. He identified the Kantian notion of a 
possible experience in general with the objective and scientific meaning 
of experience, or what he also called “the fact of science,” as opposed to 
subjective and psychological experience (see Cohen, 1883, pp. 4–7; 
1885, pp. 66–79). The reliance of the fact of science is, in Cohen’s eyes, 
what makes the transcendental philosophy the most consistent devel-
opment of critical idealism: experience is given as the actual fact of 
science; the transcendental apparatus is required to investigates how 
this fact has become possible as a priori valid. While this understanding 
of “transcendental” (as concerning the mode of cognition which makes 
actual objective knowledge possible) coincides with Kant’s definition,3 
Cohen introduced a dynamic element into the transcendental inquiry by 
focusing on the achievements of scientific knowledge. Richardson 
spelled out Cohen’s view by saying that: “Epistemology investigates how 
[objective] knowledge is possible by understanding it to be not a given 
but an achievement that is possible only on the basis of certain necessary 
presuppositions. Those presuppositions are the a priori conditions of the 
possibility of experience” (Richardson, 2003, p. 60). 
While Marburg neo-Kantians relied on Cohen’s characterization of 
transcendental philosophy, Cohen’s own attempt to implement such an 
inquiry in The Principle of the Infinitesimal Method and Its History was the 
source of much debate.4 Cohen maintained that Leibniz discovered the 
calculus in an attempt to conceptually establish the reality of differen-
tials as something instantaneous and prior to extension. According to 
Cohen, Leibniz’s discovery offered a more precise formulation of what 
Kant called Anticipations of Perception according to the principle that in 
all appearances the real, which is an object of sensation, has intensive 
magnitude (B208). This led Cohen to substantially rethink his work on 
Kant, which is evident in a second, revised edition of Cohen’s Kant’s 
Theory of Experience (1885). Here, Cohen emphasized the centrality of 
the Analytic of Principles to the point of denying that there can be a 
direct mode of cognition besides thinking or what Kant called “intuition” 
in the Transcendental Aesthetic (A20/B34). Cohen now maintained that 
the heterogeneity of the sources of knowledge in Kant’s Critique 
hampered a consequent implementation of critical idealism. Cohen’s 
efforts in this direction culminated with his Logic of Pure Knowledge 
(1902), which outlined his project of a new explanation of the possibility 
of knowledge as originating in pure thinking alone. 
The publication of Cohen’s Logic caused a lively discussion with 
2 Kant wrote: “The synthesis of spaces and time, as the essential form of all 
intuition, is that which also makes possible the apprehension of the appearance, 
and thus all outer experience, and therefore all cognition of the objects of 
experience; and what mathematics in its pure use demonstrates of the former, it 
is also necessarily valid for the latter” (A165–166/B206). All quotation from 
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason refer to the B edition. References to the corre-
sponding passages in the A edition are given, when available. English trans-
lations are from Kant (1998). 
3 Kant wrote: “I call all cognition transcendental that is occupied not so much 
with objects but with our manner of cognition of objects insofar as this is to be 
possible a priori” (B25).  
4 I rely in the following especially on Ferrari (1988) and Giovanelli (2016). I 
will not engage in a critical discussion of Cohen’s principle here. My focus is on 
the aspects of his reading of Kant, which had an influence on Cassirer. 
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Natorp, which also brought to the fore Natorp’s disagreement with 
Cohen’s interpretation of the history of calculus. Most of this discussion 
remained internal to the school. Natorp wrote a draft on Cohen’s logic 
following Hans Vaihinger’s invitation to publish a review in Kant-Stud-
ien. However, Natorp renounced to publish his review after Cohen’s 
reactions to his criticisms.5 Natorp’s main point was to defend the idea 
of an internal articulation of the transcendental apparatus against 
Cohen’s identification of intuitions as concepts and thought as knowl-
edge. To Natorp, this extreme version of idealism appeared to 
completely break with critical idealism, that is, the version of idealism 
that is supposed to rely on science. The problematic aspect of this move 
particularly concerned the explanation of the possibility of mathematics, 
which in Cohen’s view seemed to depend on the nonmathematical 
concept of intensive magnitude. Natorp had been working since the 
1890s on the problem of investigating the logical foundations of math-
ematics, including its most recent achievements. By contrast, Cohen 
seemed to neglect much of the modern mathematical debate in favor of a 
premodern view of the foundations of calculus. 
Cassirer sided with Natorp in two important respects. Firstly, Cas-
sirer (1902) offered a symbolic interpretation of Leibniz’s talk about 
“intensive magnitudes” .6 Secondly, Cassirer (1907b) deemed the 
development of mathematics a “new fact,” which critical philosophy can 
no longer ignore. As we will see in the following, Cassirer found a new 
expression of this “fact” in Substance and Function (1910) by identifying 
the fundamental type of mathematical concepts as functions. Cassirer’s 
distance from Cohen is clearly expressed here. It is revealing that Cohen, 
in turn, disagreed with the central thesis of Cassirer’s work.7 
Nevertheless, Cassirer’s early works provide evidence of an attempt 
to mediate between his teachers’ views. It is revealing, for example, that 
Cassirer relied on his interpretation of Leibniz to defend Cohen’s logic 
against Leonard Nelson’s attack.8 Another important indication of Cas-
sirer’s mediation is his assessment of Kant’s relation to Leibniz in Cas-
sirer (1907a). Following Natorp, Cassirer urged an investigation of the 
logical foundations of mathematics more in line with Leibniz: “If one 
judges Kant as a pure logician, if one considers only what he contributed 
to formal logic and to the abstract doctrine of principles of pure math-
ematics, then there is no doubt that he stayed far behind his great 
rationalist predecessors, especially Leibniz” Cassirer (1907a), p. 554). At 
the same time, as Richardson (2003) has pointed out, Cassirer agreed 
with the formulation of the task of epistemology that derived from 
Cohen’s reading of Kant. Therefore, Cassirer also claimed that the 
characteristic advantage of the Kantian approach is this: “Kant’s focus is 
on the principles of empirical knowledge. Mathematics itself is consid-
ered only insofar as it proves to be applicable to concrete actual objects” 
(1907a, p. 554). 
Cassirer went on to point out that Kant’s account of concept forma-
tion was based on the syllogistic logic of his time. Accordingly, a general 
concept is abstracted from all distinctive properties of a group of things 
as their common denominator and contains its instantiations under 
itself. However, this kind of abstraction did not account for the forma-
tion of mathematical concepts, such as by infinite partition. The very 
possibility of these kinds of procedures, which were common practice in 
Euclidean geometry, rests on the presupposition of a single space in 
which the partition takes place. Kant expressed this by saying that space 
contains spatial determinations within rather than under it (A25/B40). 
Kant famously used this distinction to characterize the pure intuitions of 
space and time in his Dissertation of 1770 and in the Critique of Pure 
Reason. However, Kant also called space one of the "concepts of pure 
understanding" (conceptus intellectus puri) in a Reflection written around 
1769 (in Kant, 1884, n. 513). According to Cassirer, This shows that 
Kant’s characterization of space originally agreed with Leibniz’s. In the 
Leibnizian terminology, space is a pure product of the mind itself 
(“intellectus ipse”), which cannot be derived from the perception of 
extended objects because it establishes the order of coexistence. Kant’s 
connection with Leibniz in 1769 suggests that: “The two moments, 
which in the Critique of Pure Reason are opposed to each other, are still 
wholly interchangeable here; the ‘intuitive’ does not stand in contrast 
with the ‘intellectual’ but is a particular determination of it” (Cassirer, 
1907a, p. 627). 
As it will be shown in the next sections, the above definition of 
“intuitive” as a particular determination of “intellectual” plays a central 
role both in Cassirer’s interpretation of Kant’s critical philosophy and in 
Cassirer’s own account of mathematical reasoning. 
Summing up the discussion so far, Cassirer used new materials from 
Kant’s Reflections to argue in favor of Cohen’s reading of Kant. The 
original designation of space and time as singular concepts shows that 
Kant came only gradually to distinguish these concepts from the rest of 
the fundamental system of pure concepts of the understanding; they 
were “objective principles of synthesis,” before they became “concepts 
of intuition” and ultimately “forms of sensibility” (Cassirer, 1907a, p. 
625). Cassirer agreed with Cohen that this circumstance also highlights 
the fact that space and time retain a fundamental role in the critique of 
reason as objective principles of synthesis rather than as independent 
faculties of the mind. At the same time, Cassirer sided with Natorp in 
urging a new account of mathematical reasoning up to the standards of 
modern mathematical logic. We can now consider how Cassirer com-
bined these two ideas in his interpretation of the Transcendental 
Deduction. 
2.2. Cassirer on the transcendental deduction and the transcendental 
account of concept formation 
Kant’s Transcendental Deduction aims to demonstrate, against 
empiricist psychology, that the categories of the understanding are 
capable of taking up the elements of cognition into the unity of con-
sciousness. The argument proceeds as follows9: 1) All of our represen-
tations of objects require a faculty for ordering mental states (synthetic 
unity of the apperception) that is distinguished from apprehension 
(B132–136); 2) The action of the understanding, through which the 
manifold of given representations is brought under an apperception in 
general, is the logical function of judgments (B143); 3) The categories 
that are schematized for our way of cognizing (A137/B176ff) are 
generated from the forms of judgment in the process of synthesizing 
intuitions by the addition of spatial and temporal content. Kant argues, 
by 2) and 3), that the manifold in a given intuition is necessarily subject 
to the categories (B143). He completes the argument by showing that, 4) 
because space and time are the only forms in which appearances become 
5 Two drafts for Natorp’s review are found is Holzhey (1986), pp. 5–96.  
6 Quite contrary to Cohen’s thesis, it followed from Cassirer’s reading that 
Leibniz had actually foreshadowed the modern account of "differentials" in 
terms of limits.  
7 Cohen wrote in a letter from August 10, 1910: “I admittedly confess that 
after my first reading of your book I still cannot discard as wrong what I told 
you in Marburg: you put the center of gravity upon the concept of relation and 
you believe that you have accomplished with the help of this concept the 
idealization of all materiality. The expression even escaped you that the concept 
of relation is a category; yet it is a category only insofar as it has a function, and 
a function unavoidably demands the infinitesimal element in which alone the 
root of the ideal reality can be found” (English translation from Giovanelli, 
2016, p. 20).  
8 As Giovanelli (2016) showed, Nelson’s review of Cohen’s Logic contained 
perhaps the most dismissive of a long series of attacks against Cohen’s inter-
pretation of the foundations of calculus. 
9 The following presentation is focused on the steps of Kant’s argument that 
are directly relevant to Cassirer’s interpretation. See Pereboom (2018) for a 
more thorough analysis of Kant’s argument, along with references to the main 
existing interpretations. While a discussion of this debate is beyond the pur-
poses of this paper, I will point out that an interpretation in line with Cassirer’s 
has been proposed by Friedman (2012). 
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accessible to us, the unity of sensibility is no other than that which the 
categories prescribe to the manifold of a given intuition. By 4), there is a 
necessary agreement between experience and the concepts of its objects 
(B167). 
It is important to notice that, as Kant himself emphasizes at each step 
of the argument, the different types of syntheses involved are inter-
connected. Any determinate intuition is only possible through the con-
sciousness of the rule-governed action of the imagination on the 
empirical manifold (B154). Such an action rests, in turn, on the spon-
taneity of the understanding, whose function is to order different rep-
resentations under a common one (A68/B93). The synthetic unity of 
apperception is the highest principle for all use of the understanding, 
including the whole of logic (B133). 
Cassirer further emphasized the interdependencies of the conditions 
of knowledge by interpreting Kant’s argument as outlining a unitary but 
internally articulated process of "synthesis"10. As Cassirer (1907a, p. 
698) put it: “The synthesis constitutes a unitary and continuous process. 
However, this process can be determined and characterized either from 
its starting point or from its goal. This synthesis has its origin in the 
understanding, but it turns to pure intuition as soon as it aims at 
attaining, through its mediation, to empirical reality.” As a result, the 
apparent separation of concepts and intuitions in the Kantian argument 
is really a “logical correlation” (Cassirer, 1907a, p. 698). 
In order to explain how such a process is possible, Cassirer outlined 
the transcendental apparatus starting from the lowest level of synthesis, 
that is, the sequence of singular representations as they present them-
selves in time. Even the apprehension of such a sequence presupposes 
what Kant called a “schema,” that is, a general rule for the representa-
tion of an object that is distinguished from the representation itself. The 
sum of the parts of an object, for example, is presupposed by, but 
distinguished from, the representation of the counted objects. Kant 
identified number as the pure schema of the concept of magnitude, 
where the rule for representing this concept is “the successive addition 
of one (homogeneous) magnitude to another” (A142/B182). The fact 
that Kant called this operation “successive” seems to suggest that this 
happens in time. However, he went on to explain that “number is 
nothing other than the unity of the synthesis of the manifold of a ho-
mogeneous intuition in general, because I generate time itself in the 
apprehension of the intuition” (A142/B182). In other words, Kant’s 
successive synthesis here indicates the indefinite iteration of the addi-
tion of one unit to another. 
In Cassirer’s view, the repetition of one single rule constitutes a 
synthesis of second order, which is able to differentiate a plurality of 
objects as positions in an ordered series. Finally, a third-order synthesis 
of such rules is required for the objective unity of experience: 
In the place of the mere undifferentiated copy by association there 
appears now a rich variety of different synthetic rules for individu-
ation and concept formation. The manifold must be conceived of, not 
only as it presents itself in an arbitrary and undifferentiated 
sequence, but as belonging to the various relations of interdepen-
dency, if the consciousness is to form a system or an objective unity 
of it (Cassirer, 1907a, pp. 711–12). 
Cassirer emphasized the gap between a “copy theory of concept 
formation by association, according to which concepts retain only a 
partial image of what different sense impressions have in common, and 
the transcendental investigation of experience as a whole system of rules 
of individuation. We have seen that Kant himself relied on such math-
ematical examples as numbers and geometrical definitions to account 
for the fact that the general rule for the representation of an object is 
distinguished from the representation itself. The decisive step for Cas-
sirer’s own argument in 1910 is a further generalization of the tran-
scendental account of concept formation to the notion of mathematical 
structures. This notion is clearly implied in the following passage: 
The example of number is particularly instructive, because it suffices 
to take into account the further scientific development of the concept 
of number in pure mathematics, the progression from rational to 
irrational numbers, and from the reals to imaginary numbers, in 
order to recognize immediately that the concepts produced here are 
not copies of actual sense impressions, but rather the outcome of 
purely intellectual operations (Cassirer, 1907a, p. 714). 
We can now consider a more precise formulation of Cassirer’s claim: 
the validity of structural procedures rests on the presupposition that mathe-
matical objects are nothing other than products of intellectual operations. 
However, this formulation also makes apparent the tension that we 
mentioned in the beginning between the different aspects of Cassirer’s 
view. On the one hand, this claim amounts to a form of methodological 
structuralism, that is, a view mainly concerned with the implications of 
structural methods in modern mathematical practice (Reck, 2003). On 
the other hand, the neo-Kantian epistemology advocated by Cassirer is 
mainly concerned with the applicability of mathematics and the possi-
bility of the mathematical science of nature. It is the applicability of 
mathematics in the natural sciences that, according to the neo-Kantian 
reconstruction, provides a proof that a priori concepts correctly apply 
to the objects experience. 
Following Marburg neo-Kantians, Friedman (2012) has explored the 
possibility of using the discussions of natural science in Kant’s Prole-
gomena and the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science to illuminate 
the corresponding discussions in his Critique. Friedman refers, more 
specifically, to the way in which Kant accounts for the necessary 
lawfulness of nature in x 36–38 of the Prolegomena, where he refers to 
Newton’s deduction of the law of universal gravitation. Kant begins his 
discussion with the fundamental properties of circles established in Book 
III of Euclid’s Elements. He goes on to point out that these properties are 
presupposed in the characterization of the relative motions of the sat-
ellites in the solar system with respect to their primary bodies. While 
these phenomena present themselves in Kepler’s rules as inductive 
generalizations, Newton’s universal gravitation allows him to derive all 
the possible orbits by stating a necessary connection between the con-
cepts of force, distances and masses. According to Friedman, this 
example shows what is essential to Kant’s conception of objective 
judgment, that is, “a procedure of synthetic determination” that begins 
by applying the transcendental unity of apperception to the pure forms 
of spatiotemporal intuition (Friedman, 2012, p. 322). We then move 
through the schemata of the individual categories to the principles of 
pure understanding corresponding to these categories. And at this level, 
we can distinguish three distinct steps. We first consider the formal 
conditions for the possibility of experience, which in the above example 
correspond to Euclid’s propositions. We are next presented with the 
material conditions for actual perception, which correspond to Kepler’s 
phenomena. Finally, with Newton’s law, we are in a position to deter-
mine what is actual as in necessary agreement with the conditions of 
experience. 
With regard to Cassirer’s claim, the question arises whether the step 
from formal to material conditions of experience can take place without 
the mediating term of pure intuitions.11 This step requires Cassirer to 
show that the kind of reasoning at work in the definition of mathematical 
structures also accounts for the applicability of mathematics in scientific 
theories. I take Cassirer (1907a) discussion of concept formation to 
elucidate a necessary premise for this argument by saying that 10 Cassirer’s terminology is derived from Kant’s characterization of the com-
bination of a manifold in general as an action of the understanding. Kant calls 
such a combination “synthesis” to indicate that “we can represent nothing as 
combined in the object without having previously combined it ourselves” 
(B130). 11 Friedman’s objection to Cassirer on this point is discussed in Section 3.2. 
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mathematical reasoning – in the above sense of structural reasoning – is 
capable of an a priori synthesis in its own domain. The following section 
considers how Cassirer continued to rely on his transcendental account 
of concept formation to articulate a neo-Kantian philosophy of 
mathematics. 
3. Cassirer’s neo-Kantian philosophy of mathematics 
This section considers how Cassirer addressed the problem to ac-
count for mathematical reasoning from a modern standpoint. Cassirer 
was one of the first neo-Kantians to take the new mathematical logic 
(also known as “logistic”) into serious consideration. As Heis (2010, 
2011) has suggested, the neo-Kantian background of Cassirer’s philos-
ophy led him to address different questions from now better-known 
approaches, such as Frege’s and Russell’s. These questions include the 
unity of mathematics over time, despite the conceptual and ontological 
revolutions that it has undergone and the applicability of mathematics 
as a precondition of objective knowledge. 
I will argue that Cassirer’s philosophical background also played an 
important role in the development of his strategy to solve the tension 
mentioned at the beginning between a unitary and a more pluralistic 
perspective on mathematics. 
3.1. The sameness thesis 
Cassirer first presented his view in “Kant and Modern Mathematics” 
(1907). The goal of this article was to counter Louis Couturat’s and 
Bertrand Russell’s view, that the logistic proves the analyticity of 
mathematics, or at least rule out the view that all mathematical prop-
ositions are synthetic a priori in the Kantian sense. As Cassirer implied in 
his considerations on Kant’s relation to Leibniz, Cassirer agreed with the 
proponents of the logistic on the problematic aspects of the Kantian 
view. Accordingly, Cassirer did not defend either of Kant’s definitions of 
synthetic judgments: 1) as judgments whose subject does not include the 
predicate by definition (A9/B13), and 2) as judgments whose concepts 
subsume a pure intuition (B73). The first definition, which is derived 
from syllogistic logic, appears to be too restrictive to even express 
mathematical judgments. Regarding 2), we have seen (2.1) that Cassirer 
ruled out intuition as a source of mathematical certainty in favor of a 
Leibnizian approach. As Cassirer (1907b, pp. 31–32) made clear, he 
agreed with Couturat and Russell that the new logic provided a further, 
mathematical proof that mathematics is independent of the represen-
tations of space and time. 
These points of agreement notwithstanding, Cassirer contended that 
there are mathematical “syntheses” in the sense elucidated in (Cassirer, 
1907a), that is, as cognitive procedures that have their origin in the laws 
of thought, and their goal in the application to empirical reality. Cassirer 
wrote: 
So, a new task begins at the very point where logistic leaves off. What 
critical philosophy searches and must require is a logic of objective 
knowledge […]. Only once we will have understood that the same 
fundamental syntheses, which lie at the foundation of logic and of 
mathematics, rule over the scientific articulation of empirical 
knowledge, that only these syntheses enable us to establish a lawful 
order of the appearances, and therefore their objective meaning, 
then, and only then we will obtain a true justification of the princi-
ples (Cassirer, 1907b, pp. 44–45). 
This is the argument that sets the main goal of Cassirer’s philosophy 
of mathematics. The central claim (that the fundamental syntheses, 
which lie at the foundation of logic and mathematics, rule over the 
scientific articulation of empirical knowledge) became known in the 
literature as the sameness thesis. 
In addition, Cassirer contended that “intuition” still plays a role in 
some branches of mathematics, if understood as a particular 
determination of intellectual procedures.12 Here Cassirer referred, more 
specifically, to cases where there is a choice between incompatible 
logical possibilities. Examples of this include the choice among different 
principles, which one can assume with equal logical right in the foun-
dation of geometry. According to Euclid’s parallel postulate, there exists 
exactly one parallel to any given line. However, this is denied without 
contradiction in the non-Euclidean hypotheses. 
What this suggests is that there are two aspects of mathematics that 
Cassirer calls synthetic. One aspect pertains to mathematical method-
ology: even if the logicist program was to provide a logical derivation of 
some parts of mathematics, intuitive considerations still play a role in 
other branches of mathematics. The other aspect is that mathematical 
syntheses play an indispensable role in the system of the principles of 
knowledge. We can see how the said tension arises here. In the former 
sense, the syntheticity of mathematics is given by a demand for unity in 
the face of different possible initial assumptions. In the latter sense, 
mathematics proves to be synthetic, insofar as the same syntheses apply 
to the order of appearances. A possible reading of the argument would 
make the syntheticity of mathematics dependent on the sameness thesis, 
which, in Mormann’s interpretation, would allow for a more liberal 
attitude towards incompatible idealizations. 
My suggestion is that Cassirer resolved this tension in 1910 by 
spelling out the meaning of “synthetic” as fulfilling the goal of uniquely 
determining the subject-matter of mathematical theories and what valid 
inferences can be made about their content. It follows that, while 
mathematics is not grounded in an independent faculty of intuition, 
mathematical reasoning has an intuitive side in itself (as a particular 
determination of the intellectual) and provides a synthesis of space and 
time as required by Kant’s transcendental claim. 
3.2. Cassirer’s view in 1910 
Cassirer reached a new perspective for the articulation of his view in 
Substance and Function (1910). The book begins by pointing out the logic 
at work in the evolution of mathematics and gradually identifies the 
elements of this logic as preconditions of experience. Finally, this logic is 
generalized to a logic of objective knowledge in the above sense. 
This new meaning of “logic” is characterized by what Cassirer called 
a reversal in the traditional, Aristotelian conception of the thing/prop-
erty relation. The comparison of things with regard to some property, in 
the Aristotelian logic, serves the purpose of abstracting from distinctive 
properties of individuals in order to form the concepts of classes to 
which they belong. Classes of individuals can be classified into genus 
and species according to their degree of abstraction following the 
principle that the less properties belong to the class, the more general 
the concept. However, this poses the problem of how to select such 
properties. This is the point at which, according to Cassirer, traditional 
logic presupposes the Aristotelian metaphysics: the process of abstrac-
tion reflects the idea that the ultimate commonalities of things depend 
on their ultimate causes or substances, and the goal of knowledge is to 
reproduce these causal relations as faithful as possible in thought. 
Cassirer maintained that a new model of concept formation emerged 
for the characterization of mathematical concepts such as series and 
limits (Cassirer, 1910, p. III). One can avoid the epistemological problem 
of abstraction here by establishing a law for the specification of (possibly 
infinite) individual cases. Cassirer pointed out that, in this way, “the 
more universal concept reveals itself also as the richer in content” (p. 
20). Whereas the particular determinations are included as predicates in 
12 Cassirer wrote: “Even within the field of pure mathematics ‘intuition’ re-
tains a broader domain and a greater significance than then the logistic can 
acknowledge. Although the progress of mathematics has shown that intuition 
fails as an autonomous means of proof, it is nonetheless necessary to indicate 
the ultimate task of our logical syntheses and thereby determine their direction” 
(Cassirer, 1907b, p. 46). 
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the concept of the subject in the traditional view, the mathematical 
concept of function provides a general rule of individuation. Cassirer 
maintained that this concept provides a new standpoint for the tran-
scendental account of concept formation and objective judgment. 
According to Friedman, Cassirer’s view is the most consistent 
implementation of the critical idealism of the Marburg School. However, 
this also shows how the neo-Kantian account of objective judgment 
fundamentally differs from Kant’s. Kant’s account, as outlined in 2.2, 
does not depend on the logical structures of judgment alone, but also on 
the forms of intuition. Since space and time no longer function as in-
dependent forms of pure sensibility in Marburg neo-Kantianism, the 
logic of objective knowledge must now proceed on the basis of purely 
conceptual – and thus non-spatiotemporal – a priori structures (Fried-
man, 2000, p. 28). Friedman goes on to point out that Cassirer identifies 
formal logic with the new theory of relations developed especially by 
Russell (1903). This suggests that mathematics is incorporated into 
formal logic and the given manifold of sensation is replaced with the 
methodological progression of mathematical natural science (Friedman, 
2000, pp. 32–33). 
We saw that a quite different picture emerged from Cassirer’s 
attempt to position himself in the debates over Cohen’s logic and on the 
implications of symbolic logic. One of the purposes of Substance and 
Function was to find a new expression for the view of knowledge as a 
unitary but internally articulated process. The concept of function 
offered a relevant basis, because “function” in Kant’s usage indicates 
“the unity of the action of ordering different representations under a 
common one,” where “concepts are grounded on the spontaneity of 
thinking” (B93). As we have seen in 2.2, Cassirer accounted for the 
further articulation of this concept as a three-step synthesis consisting 
of: apprehension of a manifold; ordering of a homogeneous manifold in 
series; and coordination of different series in an objective unity. So the 
question arises how Cassirer can recover these different steps starting 
from what appears to be a purely formal account of judgment in terms of 
the mathematical concept of function. 
A more nuanced interpretation of Cassirer is being proposed by Heis 
(2014a). Heis agrees with Friedman that there is no fundamental 
divergence between Cassirer and philosophers in the analytic tradition, 
such as Russell and the logical positivists, with regard to Kant’s pure 
intuitions. So, Heis suggests that a more promising way to locate Cas-
sirer’s contribution in the history of analytic philosophy is to clarify the 
different levels of meaning that “function” assumes in Cassirer’s work, 
as: 1) a one-one or many-one relation; 2) the role or purpose of partic-
ular mathematical or scientific concepts within this or that particular 
scientific field; 3) a rule-governed activity of the mind. The first, logical 
meaning of function is derived from Russell. However, 2) is derived from 
the methodology at work in Dedekind’s theory of numbers. Finally, Heis 
points out that Cassirer’s account of objectivity ultimately depends on 
the Kantian meaning of function expressed by 3). Heis’s clarification of 
the different meanings of function in Cassirer philosophy is very helpful 
for a better assessment of his view. However, this differentiation leaves 
out what seems, to me, to be the main point of the philosophy of the 
concept of function, namely, that function as a rule-governed activity of 
the mind still requires a schematization or additional and mediating 
structures for its empirical use. Accordingly, 2) has to do primarily with 
the transposition of structural reasoning from numerical to spatiotem-
poral domains. 
It is apparent that Cassirer bore in mind his earlier reading of Kant in 
the following passage, which is worth quoting at length, because Cas-
sirer here also summarized the main steps of his transcendental argu-
ment throughout the book: 
Every mathematical function represents a universal law, which, by 
virtue of the successive values which the variable can assume, con-
tains within itself all the particular cases for which it holds. If, 
however, this is once recognized, a completely new field of investi-
gation is opened for logic. In opposition to the logic of the generic 
concept, which, as we saw, represents the point of view and influence 
of the concept of substance, there now appears the logic of the 
mathematical concept of function. However, the field of application of 
this form of logic is not confined to mathematics alone. On the 
contrary, it extends over into the field of the knowledge of nature; for 
the concept of function constitutes the general schema and model 
according to which the modern concept of nature has been molded in 
its progressive historical development (Cassirer, 1910, p. 21). 
This definition of function suggests a parallel with what Kant called 
the successive addition of one homogeneous magnitude to another (2.2). 
Another important indication of the fact that Cassirer had Kant’s sche-
matism in mind is the fact that Cassirer used “schema” to describe how 
the model of the concept of function extends to empirical laws. Not only 
does schematization play some role in this process, but the explanation 
of how such extension takes place is the very objective of the logic of 
knowledge. This requires Cassirer to take into account the concrete in-
stantiations of the general schema of the concept of function, that is, the 
function-concepts from the exact sciences. The goal of the first part of 
the book is to show how paradigmatic examples of function-concepts in 
mathematics enable a synthesis of space and time. This is the basis for 
Cassirer’s account of scientific objectivity in the second part of the book. 
Notably, there is a clear parallel between the function-concepts under 
consideration and the three-step synthesis outlined by him in Cassirer 
(1907a). In a nutshell, the first step is to abstract away from any 
empirical representation. The second step consists in the formulation of 
a serial principle, according to which all the individuals falling under the 
concept of the series are defined as its members. The third step is the 
discovery of lawful connections (coordination) between different kinds 
of manifolds. As Ryckman (1991) has pointed out, the notion of coor-
dination occupies a central place in Cassirer’s epistemology as a new 
basis for the transcendental grounding of objectivity. This also relates to 
the fact that the term “coordination” was widely used outside mathe-
matics to indicate the relation between the symbolism of scientific 
theories and their empirical content.13 
In what follows, I will argue that the step from serial principles to 
coordination in Cassirer’s view finds its justification in the formation of 
mathematical concepts. I will turn back, in the conclusion, to how 
Cassirer’s claim that mathematical reasoning is capable of an priori syn-
thesis in its own domain relates to his transcendental argument as a whole. 
4. Function-concepts from nineteenth-century mathematics 
This section examines three specific function-concepts that illustrate 
Cassirer’s notion of synthesis in its different steps. 
4.1. The series of natural numbers 
Cassirer’s (1910) first paradigmatic example of function-concepts is 
Dedekind’s characterization of numbers as “free creations of the human 
mind”. Dedekind ascribed a creative power to the ability of the mind to 
relate things and let one thing correspond to another. The function that 
maps any number onto its successor instantiates such an ability by 
generating the whole series. 
Whether Dedekind’s talk of “creations” should be taken literally or 
not, and in the former sense, whether it should be understood as 
implying a psychological and subjective view of numbers, has been 
13 As pointed out by Ryckman (1991), the term “coordination” (Zuordnung) 
originally indicated a one-to-one relation in mathematical contexts and found 
related, but additional, applications in epistemological and methodological 
discussions within the mathematical sciences of nature. 
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much discussed.14 However, there is evidence that Dedekind viewed his 
characterization of numbers as “logical” in two important senses. The 
first sense derives from Dedekind’s methodology. He developed new 
structural procedures which would become standard set-theoretical 
techniques. An important difference to current set theory, however, is 
the fact that Dedekind took the concept of function to be as primitive as, 
rather than reducible to, sets. Dedekind did not discuss how functions 
can be presented. His notions of correspondence and mapping can be, 
nevertheless, seen as an attempt to capture the informal concept of a 
law-like correspondence, which was used in nineteenth-century geom-
etry (see Sieg & Schlimm, 2017). 
The second aspect of Dedekind’s approach is that it has a conceptual, 
rather than formal character: numbers are “created” in a logical process, 
insofar as they are identified as a new system of objects, which is neither 
located in the physical world nor coinciding with any previously con-
structed sets. Reck has called this view “logical structuralism” in order to 
emphasize the philosophical implications of Dedekind’s methodology, 
in particular the view that the structural properties of numbers deter-
mine uniquely a certain “conceptual possibility” (Reck, 2003, p. 400). 
In order to see how Dedekind’s approach implies such a view, let us 
recall briefly his main argument. Dedekind initially laid down some 
basic set-theoretical notions.15 An infinite system is such that it can be 
mapped one-to-one onto a proper part of itself. This means that there is 
at least one element in the original system, which is not included in its 
part. The natural numbers, for example, can be mapped one-to-one onto 
the even numbers. Dedekind called such a system “simple,” if it has a 
base element and there is a successor function that maps any element of 
the system onto a proper part of it. Again, the natural numbers are the 
main example here. However, Dedekind emphasized that numbers can 
be obtained only after admitting the existence of simply infinite systems, 
by considering a simply infinite system N ordered by a mapping ϕ and 
abstracting away from the particular nature of the elements. Dedekind 
spelled out his view by saying that: “With reference to this liberation of 
the elements from every other content (abstraction) we are justified in 
calling the numbers a free creation of the human mind” (Dedekind, 
1888, p. 68). He went on to show that the properties which make 
numbers distinguishable (i.e. ordinal properties) are exactly those that 
are required to have arithmetical operations. In other words, Dedekind 
identified the structural properties of numbers as their properties qua 
numbers. Any additional properties is to be clarified as nonarithmetic. 
This characterization is completed by Dedekind’s proof that any simply 
infinite system is isomorphic to the natural numbers. In current termi-
nology, Dedekind proved the categoricity of the natural numbers. 
Cassirer’s notion of function offers a viable interpretation of Dede-
kind’s view in the following sense: the ability to relate one thing to 
another in the above quote corresponds to the Kantian meaning of 
function as the rule-governed activity that is characteristic of rationality. 
Without referring to Kant, Dedekind himself seems to suggest such a 
reading in calling this “an ability without which no thinking is possible” 
(Dedekind, 1888, p. 32). Once this meaning of function is admitted, 
Cassirer emphasized that the relation established by the mind is not one 
of copy of one thing by another, but of “ideal correlation by which we 
bind otherwise totally diverse elements into a systematic unity” (Cas-
sirer, 1910, p. 36). The relata are not supposed to have an independent 
existence prior to their being related but, as far as the arithmetician is 
concerned, they exist as serial objects generated by a serial principle. 
Cassirer went on to point out that Dedekind’s talk of “creation” with 
regard to his procedure has its counterpart in the particular meaning of 
“abstraction” of natural numbers from the structure of a simply infinite 
system. The determining power of function-concepts increases in the 
measure that they are abstracted in Dedekind’s sense: the position of 
each number “is clearly determined by the others” (Cassirer, 1910, p. 
38). This is the purpose of the successor function that establishes an 
asymmetric and transitive relation between all the members of the se-
ries. Cassirer emphasized the logical nature of Dedekind’s abstraction 
and ruled out the psychological interpretation as follows: “Here 
abstraction has, in fact, the character of a liberation; it means logical 
concentration on the relational connection as such with rejection of all 
psychological circumstances, that may force themselves into the sub-
jective stream of presentations, but which form no actual constitutive 
aspect of this connection” (p. 39). 
As Yap pointed out, Cassirer provides the appropriate philosophical 
background to Dedekind’s abstraction by clarifying the claim that is 
implicit in it as follows: “The claim that we can forget about the special 
character of the elements in a simply infinite system has to be based on 
the claim that the essential relations between elements are completely 
determined” (Yap, 2017, p. 15). Yap also rightly points out that, at this 
point, categoricity is essential for Dedekind, although Cassirer does not 
mention it. Yap’s suggestion is that this is likely because Cassirer might 
have had other examples of mathematical concepts in mind, which are 
defined by non-categorical sets of axioms (e.g., groups). 
My suggestion is that the further, geometrical examples considered 
by Cassirer are instrumental to his transcendental account. Cassirer 
began with the concept of number because, on the one hand, he saw 
numbers as “rooted in the substance of rational knowledge,” but on the 
other hand, “in the thought of number all the power of knowledge seems 
contained, all possibility of the logical determination of the sensuous” 
(Cassirer, 1910, p. 27). The first claim relates to the notion of function as 
a precondition for thinking. Cassirer’s second claim relates to the 
three-step synthesis that is required for schematization in our mode of 
cognition. The definition of numbers presupposes three things. Firstly, 
that one abstracts away from all psychological representations. Sec-
ondly, a serial principle is required for the determination of numbers as 
an ordered manifold. Finally, that the natural numbers are completely 
determined by the definition of arithmetical operations on the manifold 
of a simply infinite system: i.e. complete determination presupposes the 
notion of a mathematical structure and the use of what are currently 
known as structural or axiomatic definitions (Sieg & Schlimm, 2017). It 
is no less essential to Cassirer’s view that the methodology of Dedekind’s 
work on numbers can be applied in different branches of mathematics. 
Such a view can be spelled out by saying that - once the subject-matter of 
a mathematical discipline has been conceptualized in terms of struc-
tures, the mathematical investigation can proceed to examine how a 
variety of phenomena are structurally related. This is essential if 
mathematical reasoning is to enable the conceptualization of empirical 
objects. 
4.2. Transformation groups 
Cassirer relied on Klein’s “Comparative Review of Recent Researches 
in Geometry” for the characterization of transformation groups 
(1872).16 “Transformation” in this context indicates a one-to-one map-
ping of space onto itself. Informally, transformations form a group if: i) 
The product of any two transformations of the group also belongs to the 
group; ii) for every transformation of the group, there exists in the group 
an inverse transformation. 
Klein showed that the transformation group determines what 
14 I rely in the following especially on Reck (2003) and Yap (2017), whose 
interpretations agree with Cassirer’s in taking “creation” as a logical and 
objective derivation of numbers independently of all nonarithmetical proper-
ties. For the psychological interpretation, cf. Dummett (1991).  
15 I will rely in what follows on Dedekind’s terminology and refer to sets as 
“systems.” 
16 The implementation of Klein’s comparative approach required a further 
development of group-theoretic techniques, which was mainly due to other 
mathematicians (notably Sophus Lie). I have argued elsewhere (Biagioli, 2018) 
that this partially explains the delayed reception of Klein’s ideas (1872) in 
philosophical contexts. 
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geometrical figures are. Elementary geometry reflects this fact, insofar 
as distinct figures can be identified by superposition in a congruent way. 
Group theory allows for a more precise way to express this fact by 
defining congruence as an invariant under isometries. It is also clear 
from this viewpoint that what makes figures identical depends on the 
group. Two different figures in ordinary geometry, such as a circle and a 
parabola, can be identified as a conic in projective geometry. This means 
that a circle can be transformed into a parabola by collineations. 
Having clarified that all groups are equally justifiable from a logical 
viewpoint, Klein showed how to compare different geometries by 
introducing the following principle of transfer: Suppose that a manifold 
A has been investigated with reference to a group B, and by any trans-
formation A is converted into A0, then B becomes B0 and the B0–based 
treatment of A0 can be derived from the B–based treatment of A (Klein, 
1872, p. 72). This holds true independently of the particular choice of 
the elements (e.g. points, lines or planes): for each proposition that 
follows from the assumption of a particular element, a corresponding 
assumption follows from any other element, which can be taken arbi-
trarily. A classic example of this in projective plane geometry is the 
principle of duality, according to which any true statement concerning 
relations of points can be obtained by substituting “point” for “line,” 
“collinear” for “concurrent,” and “meet” for “join.” Klein’s formulation 
of the transfer principle was derived from Otto Hesse and was used in 
analytic geometry. In generalizing this principle, Klein gained insights 
into the structural nature of the projective consideration of figures, and 
arrived at the idea of a classification of geometries as relative invariants 
of transformation groups.17 
I have argued elsewhere that Klein attached great epistemological 
importance to a form of mathematical structuralism derived from 
Dedekind, although it is characteristic of Klein’s approach that he used 
structuralism to translate from analytic geometry to other mathematical 
practices at use in descriptive geometry (Biagioli, n.d. forthcoming). 
Without going into the details of how Klein developed his view, I will 
limit myself to drawing attention to Klein’s enunciation of what the use 
of transfer principles implies: “As long as our geometrical investigations 
are based on one and the same transformation group, the geometric 
content remains unvaried […]. The essential thing is the transformation 
group” (Klein, 1872, pp. 73–74). 
Ihmig (1997) has shown in detail that there is a series of analogies 
between Cassirer’s account of concept formation and Klein’s compara-
tive approach. What I would like to add to this comparison is that the 
analogies depend, more specifically, on Cassirer’s appreciation of how 
transfer principles work: two complexes of judgments, one of which 
deals with lines and planes and the other with the circles and spheres, 
are regarded as equivalent to each other and having the same “content of 
conceptual dependencies” (Cassirer, 1910, p. 93).18 Cassirer goes on to 
point out that even the formal definition of transformation groups im-
plies that the content of geometry is characterized by structural prop-
erties. His main point, however, is that this way of considering 
geometries enables one to draw new inference by identifying equivalent 
properties across different domains. Again, the shift from functions 
defined on a particular set to functions between completely different 
domains here is consistent with the fact that function in this mathe-
matical tradition is a primitive notion. So, the crucial step for the 
introduction of function-concepts in geometry according to Cassirer is 
not the definition of groups (which, indeed, are defined by 
non-categorical sets of axioms), but the discovery of a principle for the 
classification of a plurality of geometries.19 Cassirer emphasized the 
fruitfulness of this procedure even in cases where imaginary points have 
to be postulated. This is the case with the projective definition of dis-
tance in relation to the circle at infinity. Klein developed a model of 
non-Euclidean geometry by considering this circle a limiting case (in 
which a point at infinity is taken twice); the other cases being an 
imaginary second-order surface and the inner points of a real, 
non-degenerate surface of second order. He classified geometries into 
parabolic, elliptic, and hyperbolic, respectively, which correspond to 
different possible hypotheses about metrical relations in space. With 
reference to this classification, Cassirer argued that a new synthesis of 
space and time is achieved by the introduction of structural procedures 
in geometry: 
Intuition seems to grasp the content as an isolated self-contained 
existence; but as soon as we go on to characterize this existence in 
judgment, it resolves into a web of related structures which recip-
rocally support each other. Concept and judgment know the indi-
vidual only as a member, as a point in a systematic manifold; here as 
in arithmetic, the manifold, as opposed to all particular structures, 
appears as the real logical prius. The determination of the in-
dividuality of the elements is not the beginning but the end of the 
conceptual development; it is the logical goal, which we approach by 
the progressive connection of universal relations. The procedure of 
mathematics here points to the analogous procedure of theoretical 
natural science, for which it contains the key and the justification 
(Cassirer, 1910, p. 94). 
As anticipated 3.1, “intuition,” as the terminus a quo of concept for-
mation, retains a role in determining the task of showing that mathe-
matical and natural concepts are of the same kind. As Cassirer also puts 
it, “synthesis builds the real goal of mathematical operations” (1910, p. 
96). However, Cassirer now also emphasizes that the synthetic proced-
ures under consideration are immanent to the evolution of mathematics. 
The extensibility of such procedures is justified by their structural na-
ture, which, even within mathematics, allows for an expansion of 
knowledge from the comparison of known structures. The following 
section considers an elementary illustration of how such a comparison 
works. 
4.3. Projective coordinates 
Cassirer’s (1910) chapter on geometry and the concept of space in 
Substance and Function offers a very rich overview of how different tra-
ditions in nineteenth-century geometry foreshadowed Klein’s structur-
alist ideas. Among these traditions, Cassirer attached particular 
importance to the introduction of projective coordinates in the manner 
17 For a modern presentation of Klein’s transfer principles and their implica-
tions for mathematical structuralism, see Schiemer (2020).  
18 For a detailed discussion of the notion of “transfer” in Cassirer (1910), see 
Schiemer (2018). 
19 The available English translation of Cassirer (1910) seems to suggest that 
such a principle would follow directly from the definition of group. A more 
literal translation would read: “The definition of ‘groups’ already contains a 
new and important logical moment, insofar as through it is brought to intel-
lectual unity, not so much a whole of individual elements or figures, as a system 
of operations. […] At this point, though, with the concept of the group, a 
general principle of classification is gained by which the different possible kinds 
of geometry can be unified under a single point of view and surveyed in their 
symmetric connection” (Cassirer, 1910, p. 89). 
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of Christian von Staudt; that is, without the presupposition of metrical 
concepts.20 
Von Staudt (1847, pp. 43–49) defined the fundamental invariant of 
projective geometry by using a construction that uniquely determines 
the fourth harmonic to three collinear points. In virtue of the same 
relation, it is possible to introduce a numerical scale on a projective line 
in the following way. Given two points, 0 and 1, on the line and a point 
at infinity, ∞, the construction of the fourth harmonic point 2 can be 
reiterated to generate 3, 4, and so on in order to generate a series that 
corresponds to the integer numbers. Negative and fractional numbers 
can be determined by projecting the same construction from an external 
point. However, there is a final step which requires a postulate analo-
gous to Dedekind’s assumption of the continuity of the line. In Dede-
kind’s (1872) formulation: if all points of a line fall into two classes, such 
that every point of the first class lies to the left of every point of the second 
class, then there exists one and only one point which produces this division of 
all points into two classes.21 Dedekind went on to show that for all rational 
numbers there is a corresponding division into distinct classes. However, 
it is not the case that for any such division there is a rational number. 
Dedekind introduced symbols for irrational numbers in correspondence 
with the latter divisions. His conclusion was that continuity was thus 
proved to be independent of our intuition of space. In fact, we do not 
know whether space is continuous or discrete; what we know is that, 
even in the hypothesis that space was discrete, it would be possible to 
imagine it otherwise by filling the gaps in thought. As Dedekind put it: 
“This filling up the gaps would consist in a creation of new 
point-individuals and would have to be effected in accordance with the 
above principle” (Dedekind, 1872, p. 12). 
The step that corresponds to Dedekind’s continuity in the Staudt- 
Klein construction is the postulate that, in principle, the construction 
of the fourth harmonic can be reiterated indefinitely in order for all 
intermediate points to be determined. As in Dedekind’s consideration 
about space, the postulate establishes a rule for thinking of something as 
continuous without implying an intuitive notion of this property, which 
is the same as saying that the postulate itself is compatible with 
different, even opposed intuitions. What the principle does, in any case, 
is to clarify what it would take for our intuitions to be compatible with 
the thought of continuity. This is even more apparent in the geometric 
version of the principle, insofar as there is a constructive procedure that 
leads from the characterization of the harmonic relation to the postu-
lation of an indefinite harmonic progression. 
Cassirer emphasized the philosophical significance of this kind of 
reasoning by saying that with projective coordinates there is an “in-
clusion of the spatial concepts in the schema of the pure serial concepts” 
(Cassirer, 1910, p. 87). The use of “schema” at this point shows a clear 
connection with Kant’s schematization of concepts. Cassirer’s own 
argument is summarized in a passage that is worth quoting at length for 
our following considerations: 
As in the case of number we start from an original unit from which, 
by a certain generating relation, the totality of the members is 
evolved in fixed order, so here we first postulate a plurality of points 
and a certain relation of position between them, and in this begin-
ning a principle is discovered from the various applications of which 
issue the totality of possible spatial constructions. In this connection, 
projective geometry has with justice been said to be the universal “a 
priori” science of space, which is to be placed besides arithmetic in 
deductive rigor and purity. Space is here deduced merely in its most 
general form as the “possibility of coexistence.” While no decision is 
made concerning its special axiomatic structure (in particular con-
cerning the validity of the axiom of parallels), it can be shown that by 
the addition of special completing conditions, the general projective 
determination can be successively related to the different theories of 
parallels and thus carried into the special “parabolic,” “elliptic” or 
“hyperbolic” determinations.” (Cassirer, 1910, p. 88). 
Cassirer appreciated the fact that points and numbers can be mapped 
onto each other while remaining distinct. At the same time, he pointed 
out that the mapping brings to the fore a more general structure than 
Euclidean space. In this sense, Cassirer claimed that the principle 
discovered (i.e. the geometric equivalent of Dedekind’s continuity) has 
various applications in Klein’s classification of geometries, and the 
projective model provides a “deduction” of space in its most general 
form as the “possibility of coexistence.” The fact that Cassirer used 
Kantian and Leibnizian terminologies as interchangeable here is remi-
niscent of his 1907a reading of Kant, and so is the view that mathe-
matical abstraction has its counterpart in an increased capability of 
determining something as conceptually distinct. As we saw in 2.2, this is 
what Cassirer (1907a) referred to as "logical correlation of concepts and 
intuitions." He relied on the same view in 1910 to generalize the notion 
of the form of space to the non-Euclidean cases. 
It is worth noticing that in this passage Cassirer contrasted his view 
with Russell’s (1897). This might seem puzzling, because Russell here 
also maintained that at least some fundamental properties of projective 
space (i.e., continuity, homogeneity, having a finite number of di-
mensions) are common to both Euclidean and non-Euclidean spaces. He 
deemed these properties a priori, insofar as they are necessarily pre-
supposed in the perception of extended objects. However, Russell 
deemed the concept of a projective metric a mere technicality, which 
served the purpose of mathematical convenience but did not challenge 
the Euclidean view or provide an actual classification of spaces.22 
Russell’s critique of Klein concerned, more specifically, the notion of 
coordinates which, for Russell, serve only as convenient designations for 
points that the mathematician wishes to distinguish. The distinction of 
the elements from each other, for Russell, is a presupposition rather than 
a result of the designation. The problem with projective geometry is 
particularly that distance, as a function of projective coordinates, in-
volves at least four elements. Russell’s requirement that each element be 
distinguished from each other implies that any two elements should be 
in such a relation, regardless of their relation to all others, as in the 
ordinary notion of distance (Russell, 1897, p. 35). In order to address 
this problem, Russell, in this early work, adopted a strategy that was not 
infrequent in the post-Kantian debate on the foundations of geometry23: 
our background knowledge of space includes some notions, such as that 
of the distance between two given points, with which we are immedi-
ately acquainted and which makes possible the perception of extended 
20 In the nineteenth-century terminology, von Staudt’s approach represented 
the most consistent implementation of a “synthetic” or descriptive approach to 
projective geometry without metric foundations. This did not imply avoiding 
analytic procedures altogether, as von Staudt himself introduced a generalized 
calculus of segments (called calculus of jets). He used the properties of har-
monic progressions to describe how to assign projective coordinates to the 
particular jets that correspond to cross-ratios and defined equality and opera-
tions with jets based on the properties of involutions. The construction 
described in the following relies on von Staudt’s ideas, but does not require the 
calculus of jets and is found in Klein (1893, 337–354).  
21 This property is now known as “connectedness” and requires an explicit 
axiomatic formulation, insofar as it implies the existence of irrational points. 
Klein used Dedekind’s formulation to clarify this assumption, which was im-
plicit in von Staudt’s work but not available to him at the time he wrote (cf. 
Klein, 1873, p. 132). 
22 Russell wrote: “Since these systems are all obtained from a Euclidean plane, 
by a mere alteration in the definition of distance, Cayley and Klein tend to 
regard the whole question as one, not of the nature of space, but of the defi-
nition of distance. Since this definition, on their view, is perfectly arbitrary, the 
philosophical problem vanishes – Euclidean space is left in undisputed 
possession, and the only problem remaining is one of convention and mathe-
matical convenience” (Russell, 1897, p. 30).  
23 Se Biagioli (2016) for a reconstruction of other positions in this debate. 
F. Biagioli                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 79 (2020) 30–40
39
objects. These are the notions that Russell identified as a priori. Varia-
tions of the fundamental concepts and the idea of different forms of 
space are possible but logically dependent on a priori notions. 
It is well known that Russell subsequently distanced himself from 
this view in favor of logicism. His earlier strategy, however, reflects back 
on his critique of Dedekind’s characterization of natural numbers in 
Russell (1903, p. 249). Russell’s objection is that numbers should be 
something more than the terms of relations that constitute a progression. 
They should possess intrinsic qualities which make them different from 
anything else. 
Cassirer distanced himself both from the above strategy and from 
Russell’s logicism in defending the philosophical significance of the 
emerging structuralism of nineteenth-century geometry, in particular, 
the priority of relations over things. It followed that the correlation of 
concepts and intuitions had to be established, not in the supposed evi-
dence of our acquaintance with space, but in the extension of purely 
intellectual and structural procedures from numerical to spatial con-
cepts and from there on to the appearances. 
5. Concluding remarks 
Summing up the argument from the consideration of these function- 
concepts, Cassirer began with the concept of number, not only because 
he saw numbers as “rooted in the substance of rational knowledge,” but 
also because “[i]n the thought of number all the power of knowledge 
seems contained, all possibility of the logical determination of the 
sensuous” (Cassirer, 1910, p. 27). He then moved from the serial prin-
ciple that determines the natural numbers to geometric progressions in 
order to investigate the “inclusion of the spatial concepts in the schema 
of the pure serial concepts” (Cassirer, 1910, p. 87). As in Kant’s tran-
scendental deduction, space and time provide the only possible types of 
ordering of the phenomena in a lawful way. A crucial aspect of Cassirer’s 
account, however, is the analysis of how structural procedures devel-
oped in modern mathematics by doing abstraction from spatiotemporal 
notions. 
I have drawn attention to Cassirer’s reading of Kant in (Cassirer, 
1907a) to show that there is, nevertheless, an important parallel be-
tween Cassirer’s interpretation of schematism as a three-step synthesis 
and the account of mathematical reasoning articulated in (Cassirer, 
1910). The formation of mathematical concepts presupposes, firstly, 
that one abstracts away from empirical contents. One can then establish 
the serial principles that determine the mutual relations of a manifold. 
The complete determination of mathematical objects and the justifica-
tion of mathematical deductions rests on the further presupposition that 
a variety of such manifolds follow under the concept of a mathematical 
structure. While these manifolds are not limited to spatiotemporal ones, 
Cassirer’s focus is on group-theoretical and other procedures that allow 
for an extension from mathematics to the natural sciences. His aim is to 
show that mathematical reasoning, considered in its own right, enables 
such an extension as a synthetic process of determination of in-
dividuality. This kind of reasoning is required if the application of 
mathematics to empirical reality is to be possible. Furthermore, the 
above examples show that the structure of Cassirer’s argument is closely 
connected to his reading of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction as focused 
on a unitary but internally articulated process of cognition. Insofar as 
mathematical syntheses occupy the highest level of this process, they 
deserve to be related to - but also distinguished from - empirical 
knowledge. In Cassirer’s interpretation, it is this differentiation of levels 
in concept formation that characterizes the transcendental account. 
The genuinely Kantian aspect of Cassirer’s view is often overlooked, 
arguably because the necessary applicability of mathematics (especially 
Euclidean geometry) appears to be called into question by its structural 
turn in the nineteenth century. I have argued that the originality of 
Cassirer’s approach, in response to this concern, lies in his appreciation 
of the particular structuralism that emerges in the works of mathema-
ticians such as Dedekind and Klein. The characteristic trait of this 
structuralism – I have argued also with reference to the more recent 
literature on early mathematical structuralism – is that mathematical 
objects obtain a unique characterization by extending structural pro-
cedures over a domain that is not fixed in advance. Cassirer deems this 
kind of reasoning synthetic, insofar as it determines what can be studied 
mathematically as the field of possible applications of structural pro-
cedures. In doing so, he emphasizes the epistemological implications of 
procedures that, on the contrary, appear to be mere technicalities from 
both Russell’s early Kantian stance and his later logicism. 
A weaker version of Kant’s applicability requirement follows from 
the idea that variations of these procedures contain at least some of the 
structures that are actually applied in physics. Even though a discussion 
of this point is beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth noticing that 
Cassirer continued to argue for an extension of mathematical to scien-
tific structuralism throughout his works on the foundations of twentieth- 
century physics. 
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